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JUDICIAL POLICY NULLIFICATION OF THE 
ANTITRUST SENTENCING GUIDELINE 
Abstract: The Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for special treat-
ment of hard-core cartel activity to ensure that penalties for antitrust 
crimes effectively deter and punish criminals. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
transformational sentencing cases, however, have returned significant dis-
cretion to sentencing judges, including the discretion to vary from the 
Guidelines on policy grounds. Yet, judicial discretion in sentencing is not 
unlimited. Judges are required by statute to impose sentences that are 
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the goals of sen-
tencing, subject to appellate review for reasonableness. This Note analyzes 
whether there is a sustainable basis for judicial policy disagreement with 
the Antitrust Guideline’s use of a proxy to measure economic harm. It 
proposes that appeals courts apply a sliding scale framework when review-
ing policy-based variances, and argues that judicial discretion may, in 
some instances, promote the goals of white-collar sentencing, including 
moral condemnation. Finally, this Note concludes that judicial discretion 
to vary from the Antitrust Guideline’s harm proxy, appropriately cabined 
by appellate review, would not undermine antitrust sentencing policy. 
Introduction 
 Antitrust law seeks to protect the competitive process, and thereby 
promote innovation and competition.1 The Sherman Act (“Sherman 
Act” or “Act”) was drafted in broad brushstrokes to permit regulators 
and courts to proscribe conduct that threatens the proper functioning 
of the market, yet evades specific enumeration.2 Additionally, the Act 
provides for both civil remedies and criminal sanctions pursuant to the 
same general statutory definitions of illegal conduct.3 Such vague stan-
dards, however, once raised serious due process concerns when enforc-
                                                                                                                      
1 E.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 (1984) (stat-
ing that competition ultimately “promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act 
aims to foster”); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (stat-
ing that the Sherman Act rests on “a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will 
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services”). 
2 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 
360 (1933) (“[The Sherman Act] does not go into detailed definitions which might either 
work injury to legitimate enterprise or through particularization defeat its purposes by 
providing loopholes for escape.”). 
3 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978). 
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ers pursued criminal prosecutions.4 Thus, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) currently limits criminal prosecution under the Act to hori-
zontal cartel agreements, which are per se offenses widely known to 
cause serious economic harm.5 
 Congress and policymakers agree that harsh penalties are required 
to deter and punish cartel activity, which disrupts the free market and 
harms consumers.6 Antitrust defendants found guilty of conspiring 
with competitors to fix prices, rig bids, or allocate markets are sen-
tenced pursuant to the Antitrust Sentencing Guideline (“Antitrust 
Guideline”), which recommends stiff sanctions for individuals and cor-
porations.7 For instance, the Antitrust Guideline recommends prison 
terms for almost all individual offenders.8 Moreover, corporate offend-
ers are subject to large fines, ranging from fifteen to eighty percent of 
their sales in products or services affected by a conspiracy.9 
                                                                                                                     
 The Antitrust Guideline is promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission (“Commission”), an expert independent agency author-
ized to develop guidelines for criminal sentencing.10 The product of 
 
4 See id. at 439 (noting that criminal enforcement of the Sherman Act is usually re-
served for “circumstances where the law is relatively clear and the conduct egregious” to 
avoid due process concerns); cf. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) 
(stating that “a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so 
vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as 
to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law”). 
5 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Division Manual, at III-20 (4th ed. 2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter3.pdf (“In General, current 
Division policy is to proceed by criminal investigation and prosecution in cases involving 
horizontal, per se unlawful agreements . . . .”); see Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: 
Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 5 Eur. Competition J. 19, 25–26 (2009) (“Because cartel par-
ticipants conduct themselves in the same furtive manner as other criminal conspirators, U.S. 
judges and juries tend to be comfortable with treating cartel participants as criminals.”). 
6 See infra notes 46–94 and accompanying text. 
7 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1 cmt. background 
(2012) (explaining that the Commission promulgated only one guideline covering hori-
zontal agreements traditionally prosecuted as criminal violations). The Antitrust Guideline 
is included in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which prescribes sentencing 
policy for all federal offenses. See id. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1, cmt. 1. 
8 See id. § 2R1.1 cmt. background. 
9 See id. Fines imposed under the Antitrust Guideline, however, may not exceed the 
statutory maximum of $100 million. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Nevertheless, where the fine 
is likely to exceed the statutory cap, the government may pursue a fine equal to twice the 
loss or twice the gain caused by the defendant’s conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d) (2006). 
When using this authority, the government must prove the loss or gain beyond a reason-
able doubt. See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012) (holding that 
the Apprendi rule applies to criminal fines); see also infra notes 109–121 and accompanying 
text (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2000 ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey and its sub-
sequent impact on sentencing law). 
10 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 368–69 (1989). 
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the Commission’s work—namely, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
(“Guidelines”)—are designed to promote uniformity, proportionality, 
and honesty in sentencing by structuring judicial decision making.11 
Finally, Congress empowered the Commission to review and revise the 
Guidelines based on new data and national experience.12 
 Since its debut in 1987, the Antitrust Guideline has been amended 
to compensate for congressional escalation of Sherman Act penalties.13 
The Antitrust Guideline was initially designed to correct what the 
Commission and enforcers perceived as lenient judicial sentencing pat-
terns in white-collar cases.14 Moreover, policymakers and commentators 
recognized that past sentencing practices had failed adequately to deter 
antitrust offenses.15 Accordingly, the Commission sought to develop a 
guideline that would fully deter cartel activity while reducing enforce-
ment costs.16 
                                                                                                                      
11 See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1, cmt. 3 (describing the purposes of the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”)); see also Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: 
Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 104 (1998) (“Reduction of ‘unwarranted 
sentencing disparities’ was a—probably the—goal of the [SRA].”). 
12 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, subpt. 1, cmt. 2 (stating that the Commission views the “guide-
line-writing process as evolutionary” and “expects . . . that continuing research, experi-
ence, and analysis will result in modifications and revisions”); see 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)–(p) 
(2006) (providing statutory authority for the review and revision of the Guidelines). 
13 See infra notes 170–187 and accompanying text. 
14 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon 
Which They Rest, 17 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 20 (1988) (stating that the Commission “decided to 
require short but certain terms of confinement for many white-collar offenders” to correct 
“inequities” in previous sentencing practices); see also 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (granting the 
Commission discretion to determine which crimes have been punished too leniently, and 
which too severely). 
15 See Mark A. Cohen & David T. Scheffman, The Antitrust Guideline: Is the Punishment 
Worth the Costs?, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 331, 341–43 (1989) (observing that overdeterrence 
concerns had not gained complete acceptance in legal and policy circles and that under-
deterrence concerns animated the Commission’s policy making); John M. Connor & Rob-
ert H. Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel Fines, 80 Tul. L. 
Rev. 513, 516–18 (2005); Werden, supra note 5, at 26 (arguing that “imposing serious sanc-
tions on cartel activity does not chill any legitimate, procompetitive conduct,” and con-
cluding that there is no risk of overdeterrence). 
16 See Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 339–41 (describing the Commission’s effort 
to develop a guideline that would deter cartel activity without imposing undesirable social 
costs); Werden, supra note 5, at 28 (stating that cartel sanctions must “produce sufficient 
disutility to outweigh what the participants expect to gain from the cartel activity”). Indeed, 
the Commission sought to develop sanctions that would force cartel participants to weigh the 
“net harm to others” against the risk of detection and prosecution. See William M. Landes, 
Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 652, 656–57 (1983). For example, 
if a cartel imposes an overcharge of $1000 and causes market inefficiencies (e.g., deadweight 
loss, reduced innovation) of $500, the optimal penalty is $1500, the net harm to others. Id. 
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  More recently, however, a sentencing judge challenged the pri-
macy of deterrence as the theory most relevant to the Antitrust Guide-
line.17 In 2011, in United States v. VandeBrake, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Iowa varied upward from the Antitrust Guide-
line based, in part, on a policy disagreement with its lenient treatment 
of cartel offenders.18 Consequently, the sentencing judge imposed a 
record forty-eight month jail sentence in an ordinary price-fixing and 
bid-rigging case.19 
 From 1987 through 2005, such a departure would have been un-
thinkable.20 The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”),21 which cre-
ated the Commission, also made the Guidelines mandatory.22 Thus, 
once sentencing judges applied the Guidelines, they were generally 
confined to the narrow sentencing range established by the Commis-
sion.23 The mandatory Guidelines regime, however, was reviled by 
many district court judges, and was subjected to withering academic 
criticism.24 Nonetheless, judges followed the law and faithfully applied 
the Guidelines.25 
                                                                                                                      
 
17 See United States v. VandeBrake (VandeBrake I ), 771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987–89, 1000–
04, 1011 (N.D. Iowa 2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012) (VandeBrake II ), cert. denied, 
81 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-488). But see United States v. Heffernan, 43 
F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Deterrence is the goal most pertinent to the antitrust 
guideline.”). 
18 See VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 987–89, 1004–05. 
19 See id. at 1012–13. 
20 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 145–46 (describing the strict application of 
the Guidelines under the mandatory regime). 
21 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
22 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006), invalidated by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220 (2005). 
23 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006) (providing that the “maximum of the range estab-
lished for such a term shall not exceed the minimum of that range by more than the 
greater of 25 percent or 6 months”). 
24 See, e.g., Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 121–23 (observing that the Guide-
lines’ excessive focus on the quantity of harm inflicted by a defendant marginalizes other 
factors, including the defendant’s personal characteristics, role in the offense, or potential 
for rehabilitation); Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable 
Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 Yale L.J. 1681, 1685–87, 1718–20 (1992) (describ-
ing the resistance of Article III judges to new limits on their discretion); see also Mistretta, 
488 U.S. at 422–24 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Commission is a “branchless” 
agency with a roving mandate). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (D. Mass. 2004) (stating 
that after the Supreme Court established the Guidelines’ constitutionality, the judiciary 
“appl[ied] the Guidelines as sensibly, consistently, and compassionately as their labyrin-
thine provision [would] allow”); Ryan W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: 
A First Look, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 9–10 (2010) (stating that the “mandatory [G]uidelines 
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 In the early 2000s, in a series of cases regarding the Sixth Amend-
ment jury right, the U.S. Supreme Court exposed a constitutional in-
firmity of the mandatory Guidelines regime.26 Specifically, the Guide-
lines required judges to impose sentences based on facts, other than 
prior convictions, not found by the jury or admitted by the defen-
dant.27 In 2005, this line of cases culminated in the Court’s landmark 
decision in United States v. Booker, which returned discretion to sentenc-
ing judges by rendering the Guidelines advisory.28 
                                                                                                                     
 Following its decision in Booker, the Court held that sentencing 
judges could vary categorically from the advisory Guidelines based on 
policy disagreements.29 Although some commentators opined that 
these holdings were limited to the narrow factual circumstances of 
those cases (i.e., the Guidelines’ controversial treatment of crack versus 
powder cocaine),30 the courts of appeals have concluded that sentenc-
ing judges may disagree on policy grounds with any guideline, subject 
to appellate review for reasonableness.31 Therefore, commentators 
worry that enhanced judicial discretion will undermine the Commis-
sion’s efforts to develop uniform sentencing policy.32 
 This Note analyzes whether the Antitrust Guideline’s reliance on a 
proxy to measure the economic harm inflicted by a cartel is susceptible 
to judicial policy disagreements.33 To determine the level of deference 
a reviewing court owes to a sentencing judge’s decision to vary from the 
volume of commerce proxy, this Note applies the sliding scale defer-
 
regime remained essentially intact for eighteen years” despite strident opposition from 
scholars, the defense bar, and district court judges). 
26 See infra notes 99–121 and accompanying text. 
27 Freed, supra note 24, at 1712–15. 
28 Booker, 543 U.S. at 245. 
29 See Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 263–64 (2009) (per curiam); Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 108–10 (2007). 
30 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American 
Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 454 (2010) (observ-
ing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2009 opinion in Spears v. United States “leaves open the 
most difficult problem raised by Kimbrough—whether district courts are equally free to 
disagree with the Commission in all classes of cases, or whether crack cases are sui gene-
ris”); Nancy Gertner, Gall, Kimbrough, and Me, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 1, 5 (2008) (stating 
that “[i]t is conceivable that the only Guideline really undermined by Kimbrough is the sui 
generis one dealing with crack cocaine”). 
31 See infra note 143 and accompanying text. 
32 See, e.g., Thomas M. Hardiman & Richard L. Heppner Jr., Policy Disagreements with the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines: A Welcome Expansion of Judicial Discretion or the Beginning of 
the End of the Sentencing Guidelines?, 50 Duq. L. Rev. 5, 32–34 (2012); Benjamin J. Priester, 
Apprendi Land Becomes Bizarro World: “Policy Nullification” and Other Surreal Doctrines in the 
New Constitutional Law of Sentencing, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 56–63 (2011). 
33 See infra notes 271–339 and accompanying text. 
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ence standard advanced by Justice Stephen Breyer in his concurrence 
in the 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case, Pepper v. United States.34 The stan-
dard properly accounts for the discrete institutional strengths of sen-
tencing judges, appeals courts, and the Commission with respect to 
promoting the goals of sentencing.35 This Note concludes that such a 
standard will promote rather than hinder efforts to deter cartel activity 
by providing judges with sufficient flexibility to deviate from the exist-
ing harm proxy.36 Finally, this Note argues that enhanced judicial dis-
cretion may advance other legitimate goals of white-collar sentencing, 
including moral condemnation.37 
 Part I of this Note discusses criminal antitrust enforcement pol-
icy.38 Part II provides a brief history of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and describes the Antitrust Sentencing Guideline.39 Part III ar-
gues that judicial discretion in sentencing—if appropriately cabined by 
appellate review—may enhance the goals of antitrust sentencing.40 It 
then concludes by evaluating when policy-based variances from the An-
titrust Guideline will further antitrust sentencing policy.41 
                                                                                                                     
I. Uncovering Cartels: Criminal Enforcement Under  
the Sherman Act 
 The Sherman Act is a sweeping antitrust statute subject to both 
civil and criminal enforcement.42 This Part focuses on criminal en-
forcement and sentencing of Sherman Act violations.43 Section A in-
troduces the core provisions of the Act, tracks the development of the 
legal rules governing its broad proscriptions, and examines the policies 
underlying its passage.44 Section B details the history of the Act’s statu-
tory penalties.45 
 
34 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1253–55 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
35 See infra notes 139–161 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 214–346 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 214–346 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 42–94 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 95–213 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 217–259 and accompanying text. 
41 See infra notes 260–339 and accompanying text. 
42 Donald I. Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman Act En-
forcement, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 405 (1978). 
43 See infra notes 46–94 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 46–79 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 80–94 and accompanying text. 
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A. Criminal Enforcement of the Sherman Act 
1. The Development of Legal Standards 
 The Sherman Act is written in expansive terms.46 Section 1 of the 
Act proscribes “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy, in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with for-
eign nations.”47 Section 2 makes it unlawful for any person to “mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire . . . to 
monopolize” any part of interstate or foreign commerce.48 Unlike most 
criminal statutes, the Sherman Act does not specifically enumerate the 
conduct that it proscribes.49 Therefore, Congress left it to the courts to 
determine whether alleged conduct violates the Act.50 
                                                                                                                     
 In 1911, in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that Congress intended to prohibit only those com-
binations and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade.51 The Court ob-
served that if the Act were given its plain meaning, then it would 
invalidate almost every commercial agreement.52 Accordingly, the Court 
applies the “rule of reason” to determine on a case-by-case basis whether 
an agreement is unreasonable.53 Under the rule of reason, a court 
weighs the procompetitive benefits of the challenged conduct against its 
anticompetitive effects and condemns conduct when the anticompeti-
tive effects outweigh the procompetitive benefits.54 
 Conversely, when experience with particular types of conduct es-
tablishes that such conduct is plainly anticompetitive and lacks any re-
deeming virtue, the Court will conclusively presume that such conduct 
 
46 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006); see also Bob Nichols & Eric Schmitt, Antitrust Violations, 
48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 335, 336 (2011) (noting that the Supreme Court “has compared the 
‘generality and adaptability’ of the Act to that of a constitutional provision” (quoting Appa-
lachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 359–60)). 
47 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
48 Id. § 2. 
49 See U.S. Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438 (noting that “[b]oth civil remedies and criminal 
sanctions are authorized with regard to the same generalized definitions of the conduct 
proscribed”). 
50 21 Cong. Rec. 2460 (1890) (statement of Sen. John Sherman) (“I admit that it is 
difficult to define in legal language the precise line between lawful and unlawful combina-
tions. This must be left for the courts to determine in each particular case.”). 
51 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
52 Id. 
53 Texaco v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 (2006); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 
468 U.S. 85, 98, 103 (1984). 
54 See, e.g., Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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is unlawful.55 That is, such conduct is deemed illegal without inquiry as 
to its actual competitive effects.56 This categorical approach, as the 
Court has explained, provides clear and administrable guidance to the 
business community and promotes judicial efficiency.57 Under current 
practice, criminal prosecution of the antitrust laws is confined to hard-
core cartel conduct, including horizontal agreements between com-
petitors to fix prices,58 rig bids,59 or allocate markets.60 Moreover, these 
agreements are per se illegal because their only rational purpose is to 
stifle competition by restricting output and raising prices.61 Thus, prac-
tically all criminal prosecutions under the Act involve conduct covered 
by a per se rule.62 
2. The Sherman Act’s Goals: Allocative Efficiency, Fairness, and Moral 
Condemnation 
 The fundamental purpose of the Sherman Act is to protect the 
competitive process.63 As the Court has concluded, the Act “reflects a 
                                                                                                                      
 
55 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (observing that certain “types of re-
straints . . . have such predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect[s], and such lim-
ited potential for procompetitive benefit[s], that they are deemed unlawful per se”). Fur-
thermore, the Court will discard per se rules when economic conditions or new economic 
learning show that per se condemnation is no longer justified. See, e.g., Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007) (eliminating the per se rule 
against minimum resale price maintenance); Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57–59 (eliminating the 
per se rule against vertical non-price restraints). 
56 Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 350–51 (1982). 
57 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 & n.16. Thus, the application of the per se rule avoids the 
significant costs in business certainty and litigation efficiency of comprehensive rule-of-
reason analysis. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 343–44. 
58 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (holding that “a 
combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, 
pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is ille-
gal per se”). 
59 Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look 
For, U.S. Dep’t of Justice 2, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/211578.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 18, 2013) (defining bid rigging as a practice whereby “competitors agree in ad-
vance who will submit the winning bid on a contract being let through the competitive bid-
ding process”). 
60 United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 667 (7th Cir. 2000) (defining market alloca-
tion as the division of markets between competitors based on geography, product lines, or 
customer groups). 
61 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963). 
62 See Baker, supra note 42, at 409 (stating that “most criminal antitrust cases involve 
hard-core price fixing and market allocations in which the defendants have clear notice” 
that the conduct is subject to criminal prosecution). 
63 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). As the Court explained in 
the 1958 case, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States: 
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legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only 
lower prices, but also better goods and services.’’64 Cartel activity un-
dermines this key legislative goal because competitors agree on the 
terms of competition, including price and output.65 The resulting 
agreement reduces consumer welfare by undermining the competitive 
dynamics of the marketplace, thereby distorting the efficient allocation 
of scarce resources.66 Thus, in view of the intended design of the Act as 
a charter of economic liberty, hard-core cartel conduct is considered 
the supreme evil of antitrust.67 
 Commentators argue that the Sherman Act was intended to im-
prove allocative efficiency by targeting conduct that reduces output and 
raises prices.68 According to this view, free competition ensures that 
society’s scarce resources are put to their highest and best use by creat-
ing incentives for producers to increase output until marginal cost 
equals the market clearing price.69 Thus, Congress was concerned with 
increasing total welfare and did not intend to accomplish goals unre-
lated to economic efficiency, such as the redistribution of wealth.70 Re-
distributional concerns “could only rest upon a tenuous moral 
ground.”71 Therefore, the Sherman Act sought to outlaw conduct 
found harmful to economic efficiency.72 
                                                                                                                     
 Other commentators, however, contend that Congress sought to 
correct the unfair accumulation of wealth that threatened to disrupt 
 
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic 
liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of 
trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive 
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest 
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic political and social institutions. 
Id. 
64 Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695. 
65 See Werden, supra note 5, at 22–23. 
66 See Andreas, 216 F.3d at 667. 
67 See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 
(2004). 
68 See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 91 (1978) (“The whole task of 
antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve allocative efficiency without impair-
ing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer 
welfare.”); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 28 (2d ed. 2001) (“[W]henever monopoly 
would increase efficiency it should be tolerated, indeed encouraged.”). 
69 See Bork, supra note 68, at 91. 
70 Id. at 111. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 91. 
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the free-enterprise system and to fray the social and political fabric of 
the nation.73 These commentators argue that Congress condemned 
anticompetitive conduct because it victimizes consumers by transfer-
ring wealth to cartels.74 Thus, in their view, cartel behavior is aptly la-
beled “theft by well-dressed thieves.”75 Indeed, as these commentators 
note, Congress condemned cartels in strong moral terms and even lik-
ened the so-called robber barons to common fraudsters.76 
 Therefore, although the pursuit of economic efficiency has 
strongly influenced U.S. antitrust policy, fairness and moral considera-
tions may still have a place in antitrust.77 This is particularly true in the 
criminal context, where white-collar antitrust crimes are routinely con-
demned as theft and fraud.78 Finally, courts have stressed both the con-
sumer welfare and moral considerations underlying the Act.79 
                                                                                                                      
 
73 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65, 101 (1982) (“The Sher-
man Act was intended not only to achieve competitive prices but also to restructure the 
economy in ways insuring a ‘fair’ process for economic, social, and political decisionmak-
ing by reducing the unfairly accumulated power of the trusts.”); Maurice E. Stucke, Recon-
sidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 551, 611 (2012) (“[A]ntitrust officials who warn 
about social, moral, and political values polluting antitrust analysis are not arguing for 
sound competition analysis.”). 
74 See Lande, supra note 73, at 95 (stating that “Congress condemned monopolistic 
overcharges in strong moral terms, rather than because of their efficiency effects” because 
such effects were not readily observable); Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 443, 495 (noting that “few people in society, if asked about price fix-
ing, would graph in their minds a triangle representing the deadweight welfare loss”). 
75 Stucke, supra note 74, at 502 (quoting Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, The Antitrust Division’s International Anti-Cartel Enforcement Program 5 
(Apr. 6, 2000), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/4498.pdf). 
76 See Lande, supra note 73, at 94–96; see also Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law 
Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 693, 714 (2001) 
(observing that “[r]obber barons and cartel conspirators are bad people in the American 
popular lexicon”); Stucke, supra note 74, at 495–503 (positing that “[a]ntitrust for most is 
ultimately grounded in the moral norm of fairness”). Today, the enforcement organization 
coordinating the investigation of the LIBOR rate-rigging conspiracy denounces white-collar 
criminals in similar terms. About the Task Force, Fin. Fraud Enforcement Task Force, 
http://www.stopfraud.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (noting that “[f]inancial 
fraud takes many different shapes, and fraudsters wear many different masks,” but proclaim-
ing that “the American people have something on their side the fraudsters don’t: the force of 
the largest coalition of federal, state and local partners ever assembled to combat fraud”). 
77 See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfers (Not Just Effi-
ciency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 Antitrust L.J. 631, 640 (1989) (arguing that in antitrust, 
the “wealth transfer view is at least as administrable as the efficiency view”); cf. Werden, 
supra note 5, at 24 (describing cartel activity as a “major breach of social norms”). 
78 See, e.g., VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (stating that “[b]y rigging bids on 
these public works projects, VandeBrake effectively robbed several local governments of 
monies that could have been used for the betterment of their communities”); Werden, 
2013] Judicial Policy Nullification of the Antitrust Sentencing Guideline 871 
B. Statutory Penalties for Sherman Act Violations 
 To adequately deter and punish cartel behavior, Congress has 
steadily escalated the maximum fines and prison terms for criminal vio-
lations of the Sherman Act.80 When the Sherman Act was enacted in 
1890, the penalties were light.81 Moreover, most early criminal cases 
under the Act were unsuccessful.82 Juries failed to convict, and, when 
they did, courts eschewed jail sentences, opting for nominal fines.83 
Thus, light penalties and lenient judicial sentencing practices reflected 
a consensus that cartel activities were merely aggressive competition 
rather than crimes of moral turpitude.84 Consequently, penalties im-
posed under the Act were simply internalized as overhead.85 
 It was not until 1974 when it increased the maximum jail term to 
three years that Congress made Sherman Act violations felonies.86 Yet 
following this amendment, sentencing judges remained reluctant to 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 5, at 23 (stating that “[c]artel activity is properly viewed as a property crime, like 
burglary or larceny, although cartel activity inflicts far greater economic harm”). 
79 See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553–54 (1944) (noting that 
the power of monopolies to “fix prices, to restrict production, to crush small traders, and 
concentrate large power in the few to the detriment of the many, were but some of [the] 
numerous evils ascribed to them”); Kochert v. Greater Lafayette Health Servs., Inc., 463 
F.3d 710, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The principal purpose of the antitrust laws is to prevent 
overcharges to consumers.”). 
80 See Stucke, supra note 74, at 460–61. In addition, Congress provided a gap-filler pro-
vision for offenses involving large losses, allowing prosecutors to seek fines equal to twice 
the loss or twice the gain. Criminal Fine Improvements Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-185, 
101 Stat. 1279 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2006)). 
81 See Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1–2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 1–2 (2006)) (imposing a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in prison and a max-
imum fine of $5000). 
82 See Stucke, supra note 74, at 461 n.57 (noting that the government “lost (or dis-
missed) twenty-three of the thirty-six criminal antitrust cases brought between 1890 and 
1910”). 
83 See id. at 461–62. 
84 See VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1003 (discussing the history of overly lenient an-
titrust sentencing practices); John J. Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal Anti-
trust Laws, 45 Tex. L. Rev. 1301, 1315–18 (1967); see also Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to 
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 
Emory L.J. 1533, 1614 (1997) (concluding that the “moral content of regulatory offenses 
is far more complex and varied than previously recognized”). 
85 See Makan Delrahim, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Ba-
sics of a Successful Anti-Cartel Enforcement Program 2 (Apr. 20, 2004), http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/203626.pdf (“If the potential punishments are not suffi-
ciently significant, the potential sanctions will likely be internalized merely as a cost of 
doing business.”). 
86 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 3, 88 Stat. 
1706, 1708 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3). 
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impose jail sentences.87 In 1990, Congress increased the maximum fines 
to $10 million for corporations and $350,000 for individuals.88 More 
recently, in 2004, Congress dramatically escalated criminal penalties un-
der the Act.89 The 2004 amendment provides for maximum jail terms of 
ten years and fines of up to $100 million for corporations and $1 million 
for individuals.90 Thus, each time Congress has revisited the issue it has 
found that existing penalties suboptimally deter cartel activity.91 
 The 2004 amendment was intended to signal that “criminal anti-
trust violations are serious white-collar crimes that should be punished 
in a manner commensurate with other felonies.”92 Moreover, enforcers 
note that Congress’s gradual escalation of Sherman Act criminal penal-
ties reflects both the greater moral opprobrium attached to white-collar 
crime and a determination that cartel activity is not adequately de-
terred.93 Yet one sentencing judge recently opined that the penalties 
currently imposed for antitrust offenses are not proportionate with 
similar felonies.94 
                                                                                                                      
87 See Baker, supra note 76, at 706 (stating that sentencing judges often viewed white-
collar defendants as “pillars of the community” and therefore were reluctant to impose 
prison sentences); see also Stucke, supra note 74, at 463–64 (noting that in the late 1970s, a 
“higher percentage of persons convicted of violating migratory bird laws were sentenced to 
prison, and for longer terms, than antitrust offenders”). 
88 Antitrust Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-588, § 4, 104 Stat. 2879, 2880 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3). 
89 See Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–3). 
90 Id. 
91 See Stephen Calkins, Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies’ Bi-Modal Penalties, 
60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 127, 130–31 (1997). Some commentators, however, warn that 
excessive criminal penalties for hard-core cartel conduct could chill legitimate business 
activity. See Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 341. 
92 150 Cong. Rec. 11,281 (2004) (statement of Reps. James Sensenbrenner & John 
Conyers). 
93 See Baker, supra note 76, at 713–14; Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, The Evolution of Criminal Antitrust Enforcement over the Last 
Two Decades 4–5 (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/255515. 
pdf (noting that penalties imposed for cartel offenses have dramatically increased, in part, 
because judges recognize the seriousness of cartel conduct). But cf. VandeBrake I, 771 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1001 (observing that, “[g]iven the important purpose served by the Sherman 
Act, the relatively low maximum sentence . . . and the rather lax sentencing structure un-
der the Sentencing Guidelines for Sherman Act violations is surprising”). 
94 See VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1002–03. 
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II. Judicial Transformation of the Federal  
Sentencing Guidelines 
 This Part provides a brief review of the U.S. Supreme Court’s sen-
tencing jurisprudence, which is essential to understanding the ongoing 
institutional struggle over sentencing policy.95 Section A provides a 
brief history of the Guidelines and discusses the Court’s transforma-
tional sentencing jurisprudence.96 Section B describes the procedure 
for post-Booker application of the advisory Guidelines, including the 
role of appellate review in cabining judicial discretion.97 Finally, Section 
C describes individual and corporate sentencing under the Antitrust 
Sentencing Guideline and related provisions.98 
A. A Brief History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
 Federal district court judges were traditionally afforded almost un-
bridled discretion to sentence defendants within the broad statutory 
ranges provided by Congress.99 Under this system of “indeterminate” 
sentencing, similarly situated defendants would receive dissimilar sen-
tences based on the judge assigned to their case.100 Moreover, sentenc-
ing decisions generally were not subject to appellate review.101 This sys-
tem undermined respect for the rule of law.102 Thus, in 1984, Congress 
passed the SRA, imposing a mandatory sentencing regime that substan-
tially curtailed judges’ sentencing discretion.103 The SRA sought to re-
duce unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly situated de-
fendants by channeling a sentencing judge’s discretion within the 
                                                                                                                      
95 See infra notes 99–213 and accompanying text. 
96 See infra notes 99–121 and accompanying text. 
97 See infra notes 122–161 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 162–213 and accompanying text. 
99 See Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 5 (1973) 
(“[T]he almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the fashioning 
of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule 
of law.”). 
100 See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1257 (2011) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“[E]ach federal district judge was free to implement his or her individual sentencing phi-
losophy, and therefore the sentence imposed in a particular case often depended heavily 
on the spin of the wheel that determined the judge to whom the case was assigned.”); 
Scott, supra note 25, at 8 (“A principal purpose of the [SRA] was to reduce inter-judge 
disparity in sentencing.”). 
101 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 9. 
102 See Frankel, supra note 99, at 5–6. 
103 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). 
874 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54:861 
statutory ranges provided for federal crimes.104 To that end, Congress 
created the Commission and delegated the authority to promulgate 
mandatory sentencing guidelines.105 
 In 1989, two years after the Guidelines had taken effect, the U.S. 
Supreme Court upheld the SRA against a constitutional challenge in 
Mistretta v. United States.106 Following the Court’s decision, the manda-
tory Guidelines regime flourished as sentencing judges complied with 
the Court’s command.107 Nonetheless, district court judges recognized 
that the mandatory Guidelines limited their discretion, ignored their 
institutional expertise, and violated the constitutional rights of defen-
dants.108 
 After nearly two decades of experience with mandatory sentenc-
ing, the Supreme Court began to address these concerns.109 In 2000, in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Court invalidated a state statute that permit-
ted sentencing judges to impose sentences beyond the statutory maxi-
mum based on facts not proven to the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.110 Similarly, in 2004, in Blakely v. Washington, the Court held that 
                                                                                                                      
104 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 4–6; Scott, supra note 25, at 8 & n.33. 
105 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2006). 
106 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989). The Court upheld the SRA against challenges that it vio-
lated the non-delegation doctrine and separation of powers principles. Id. First, the Court 
held that Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the Commission, an independent 
agency in the judicial branch, to promulgate sentencing guidelines for a wide range of 
offenses was “sufficiently specific and detailed to meet constitutional requirements.” Id. at 
374, 412. Second, the Court held that placement of the Commission within the judicial 
branch did not threaten to undermine the judiciary’s independence, and was consistent 
with a flexible understanding of separation of powers. Id. at 380–412. 
107 See United States v. Green, 346 F. Supp. 2d 259, 279 (D. Mass. 2004) (noting that af-
ter the Supreme Court established the Guidelines’ constitutionality, district court judges 
faithfully applied them); see also Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American 
Judges and Sentencing, 4 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 523, 531–36 (2007) (describing how district 
court judges succumbed to the mandatory sentencing regime and failed adequately to 
defend their institutional prerogatives and expertise). 
108 See, e.g., United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 283 (D. Mass. 2006) (not-
ing that “a generation of federal trial judges ha[d] lost track of certain core values of an 
independent judiciary because they ha[d] been brought up in a sentencing system that 
strip[ped] the words ‘burden of proof,’ ‘evidence,’ and ‘facts’ of genuine meaning”); 
Gertner, supra note 107, at 530 (noting that a common theme among judicial criticism of 
the mandatory Guidelines regime was that “sentencing was a judge’s special expertise and 
that sentencing guidelines represented a risk to judicial independence”). 
109 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 379 (describing the “agonizing doctrinal train wreck 
the Supreme Court has engineered at the intersection between the structured sentencing 
movement and the Sixth Amendment jury right”). 
110 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, 
any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). 
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Washington State’s mandatory sentencing regime violated a defen-
dant’s Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a rea-
sonable doubt every fact legally essential to the sentence imposed.111 
Thus, the stage was set for the Court’s invalidation of the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, which likewise required judges to impose sentences 
based on facts not proven to the jury or admitted by the defendant.112 
 In 2005, in United States v. Booker, a fractured Court concluded that 
the SRA violated a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
and imposed a remedy that rendered the Guidelines advisory.113 The 
Court produced two majority opinions.114 First, Justice John Paul Ste-
vens, writing for a majority on the question whether the Guidelines vio-
lated a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial, extended the 
Court’s holdings in Apprendi and Blakely.115 Justice Stevens concluded 
that the fundamental role of the jury had been usurped because the 
Guidelines required judges to impose sentences based on factual find-
ings—other than prior convictions—not found by the jury or admitted 
by the defendant.116 
 Instead of adopting Justice Stevens’s preferred remedy of requir-
ing a jury to find every fact legally essential to the punishment,117 a 
separate remedial majority salvaged the Guidelines by rendering them 
advisory.118 The remedial majority, led by Justice Stephen Breyer—a 
member of the original Sentencing Commission119—invalidated the 
constitutionally defective sections of the SRA that required judges to 
                                                                                                                      
111 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (holding that “the statutory maximum for Apprendi pur-
poses is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts re-
flected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant” (emphasis omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
112 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 424–25 (noting that the Guidelines required judges to 
assess “relevant conduct,” including unconvicted crimes and misconduct of co-conspirators); 
see also Note, The Unconstitutionality of Determinate Sentencing in Light of the Supreme Court’s “Ele-
ments” Jurisprudence, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1236, 1250–52 (2004) (concluding that the Apprendi 
rule rendered the Guidelines unconstitutional). 
113 543 U.S. 220, 236–37, 245 (2005). 
114 Id. at 226, 244. 
115 Id. at 243–44 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion in part). 
116 Id. at 236–37. The Guidelines require judges to impose sentences based on real of-
fense conduct—that is, based on adverse factual information determined by the judge at 
the sentencing stage merely by a preponderance of the evidence. See Rachel E. Barkow, 
Sentencing Guidelines at the Crossroads of Politics and Expertise, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1599, 1626–
29 (2012); Freed, supra note 24, at 1712–15. 
117 Booker, 543 U.S. at 284–85 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
118 Id. at 244–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion in part). 
119 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 49–50 (describing Breyer’s appointment to 
the Commission and commitment to sentencing reform); see also Breyer, supra note 14, at 
1–2 (defending the work of the Commission). 
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impose Guidelines sentences and courts of appeals to enforce that 
mandate through de novo review of sentencing decisions.120 Then, pre-
sumably to cabin judicial discretion, the remedial majority required 
courts of appeals to review sentencing decisions for “reasonableness.”121 
B. Application of the Advisory Guidelines: Individualized Assessments and 
Appellate Review for Reasonableness 
1. Individualized Assessments 
 The Court’s post-Booker sentencing decisions have returned discre-
tion to sentencing judges.122 The precise scope of that discretion, how-
ever, is unclear.123 In 2007, in Gall v. United States, the Court reiterated 
its position in Booker that the advisory Guidelines are entitled to great 
respect.124 Therefore, to reduce sentencing disparity and to encourage 
deference to the advisory Guidelines, the Court outlined a three-step 
process by which a court should determine a defendant’s sentence.125 
 First, the court is required to calculate the proper Guidelines 
range.126 As the Supreme Court has explained, relying on the advisory 
Guidelines as the “initial benchmark” helps to ensure nationwide con-
sistency in sentencing outcomes and signifies deference to the Com-
                                                                                                                      
120 Booker, 543 U.S. at 259; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006) (requiring sentencing 
judges to impose sentences within the Guidelines); id. § 3742(e) (requiring de novo appel-
late review of departures from the Guidelines’ range). As courts and commentators have 
observed, the remedial majority in Booker does not squarely address the constitutional vio-
lation. See, e.g., Booker, 543 U.S. at 302 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part) (observing that the 
remedial majority “eliminated the very constitutional right Apprendi sought to vindicate”); 
Barkow, supra note 116, at 1626–29 (noting that under the advisory Guidelines regime, 
judges are still permitted to base sentencing decisions on acquitted conduct). As Judge 
William G. Young has observed, the remedial majority in Booker did not focus the remedy 
on who was performing the fact-finding (i.e., the judge), but rather sought to render those 
“facts unnecessary by making the Guidelines effectively advisory.” See Kandirakis, 441 F. 
Supp. 2d at 289–90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260–64; Bowman, supra note 30, at 440 (“Without appellate 
authority to reject some sentences as unreasonable correlations between facts and out-
comes, the sentencing power of judges would be unconstrained . . . and thus not subject to 
the rule of law.”); see also David J. D’Addio, Sentencing After Booker: The Impact of Appellate 
Review on Defendants’ Rights, 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 173, 192 (2006) (‘‘[T]o the degree 
that ‘reasonableness’ cabins discretion, the Sixth Amendment problem resurfaces.’’). 
122 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 447–55. 
123 See id. 
124 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); see also United States v. Cavera, 550 
F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (noting that the Guidelines do not exist “merely as 
a body of casual advice” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
125 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51. 
126 Id. 
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mission’s expertise.127 Second, the court must determine whether a 
departure is appropriate under the circumstances.128 Third, the court is 
required to consider whether the recommended sentence is “sufficient, 
but not greater than necessary,” to achieve the goals of sentencing 
listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (the “sentencing factors”).129 If the court 
concludes that the recommended sentence fails to satisfy this so-called 
parsimony provision, it may impose an upward or downward variance130 
based on its analysis of the sentencing factors.131 
 Under the advisory Guidelines regime, judges are required to bal-
ance the sentencing factors prescribed by Congress in the SRA to 
“make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”132 
Among other things, the sentencing judge must assess the “nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant’’;133 the need for a sentence ‘‘to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just pun-
ishment for the offense’’;134 and the need for a sentence ‘‘to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.’’135 Furthermore, the judge 
must consider “any pertinent policy statement” issued by the Commis-
sion, the “sentencing range established’’ for similar offenses, and the 
“need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities” among similarly situ-
                                                                                                                      
127 See id.; see also id. at 63 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “[d]istrict courts must not 
only ‘consult’ the Guidelines, they must ‘take them into account’” (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. 
at 244–45)). In addition, appellate courts may presume that a within-Guidelines sentence is 
“reasonable.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2007) (reasoning that a presump-
tion of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences “simply recognizes the real-world cir-
cumstance that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view 
of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in [ordinary] cases, it is probable that the sen-
tence is reasonable”); see 28 U.S.C. § 994(g) (2006) (requiring the Commission to develop 
guidelines “to meet the purposes of sentencing as set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 18”). 
128 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51. Departures are enhancements of, or subtractions from, a 
Guidelines calculation based on a specific Guidelines departure provision. See Irizarry v. 
United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714–15 (2008). 
129 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–51; see also Kimbrough v. United 
States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007) (describing the parsimony clause of § 3553(a) as an “over-
arching provision”). 
130 Variances are discretionary changes to a Guidelines sentence based on a judge’s re-
view of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. Chase, 560 F.3d 828, 830–31 
(8th Cir. 2009). 
131 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50–51; see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 194 (stating that “discretion is 
like an elevator in that it must run in both directions”). 
132 Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. 
133 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 
134 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). 
135 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(B). 
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ated defendants.136 In practice, however, these factors may frequently 
conflict.137 Consequently, no single factor is dispositive.138 
.143 
                                                                                                                     
2. Reasonableness Review and the Sliding Scale Framework for 
Appellate Review of Judicial Policy Disagreements 
 Once the district court imposes its sentence, either the govern-
ment or the defendant may challenge the sentence for procedural de-
fects or substantive reasonableness.139 The remedial majority in Booker, 
however, offered little guidance on the scope of reasonableness re-
view.140 Then, in 2007, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Court held that 
a sentencing judge could vary from the now-advisory Guidelines based 
on his or her categorical policy disagreement with the one-hundred-to-
one ratio for crack versus powder cocaine.141 The Court reiterated this 
holding in 2009, in Spears v. United States, when it held—again in the 
context of cocaine sentencing—that a judge may categorically reject 
the Guidelines on policy grounds in ordinary cases.142 Courts of ap-
peals have almost uniformly concluded that the holdings of Kimbrough 
and Spears apply with equal force outside the cocaine context
 Although the Court has not yet offered binding guidance on the 
level of deference reviewing courts should afford a sentencing judge’s 
 
136 Id. § 3553(a)(4)–(6). 
137 Rita, 551 U.S. at 350 (noting the “abstract and potentially conflicting nature of 
§ 3553(a)’s general sentencing objectives”). 
138 See, e.g., Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193 (“[W]e do not require ‘robotic incantations’ that 
the district court has considered each of the § 3553(a) factors.”). 
139 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (providing for appellate review of district court sentencing deci-
sions); accord Chase, 560 F.3d at 830 (“If the sentence is procedurally sound, we then review 
its substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”). 
140 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 66–67 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “Booker restored to the 
district courts at least a measure of the policymaking authority that the [SRA] had taken 
away,” but that the issue was how much authority was actually restored); see also Kandirakis, 441 
F. Supp. 2d at 286 (noting that “[h]ow logically to implement [Booker’s] two majority opinions 
has been a question with which the lower federal courts have been grappling ever since”). 
141 See 552 U.S. at 108–10. 
142 See 555 U.S. 261, 263–65 (2009) (per curiam). 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Corner, 598 F.3d 411, 415 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“We 
understand Kimbrough and Spears to mean that district judges are at liberty to reject any 
Guideline on policy grounds—though they must act reasonably when using that power.”); 
United States v. Carr, 557 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he sentencing court has discre-
tion to deviate from the Guidelines-recommended range based on the court’s disagree-
ment with the policy judgments evinced in a particular guideline.”); United States v. 
Gardellini, 545 F.3d 1089, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Kimbrough . . . held that district courts 
are free in certain circumstances to sentence outside the Guidelines based on policy dis-
agreements with the Sentencing Commission—and that appeals courts must defer to those 
district court policy assessments.”). 
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policy disagreement with a guideline, the justices have offered one po-
tential framework.144 In Kimbrough, the Court suggested that a sentenc-
ing judge’s policy determination may attract greater scrutiny when the 
judge varies from the Guidelines “based solely on the judge’s view that 
the [advisory] Guidelines range fails properly to reflect [the goals of 
sentencing] even in a mine-run case.”145 The Court further noted that 
although the Guidelines are advisory, they are nonetheless entitled to 
respect, especially when the Commission is fulfilling its “characteristic 
institutional role” analyzing “empirical data and national experi-
ence.”146 Conversely, the Court reasoned that a policy-based variance 
would attract the “greatest respect” where the Guidelines fail to account 
for the facts of the case.147 
 Justice Breyer’s recent concurrence in the 2011 U.S. Supreme 
Court case, Pepper v. United States, further elaborates on this sliding scale 
framework.148 According to Justice Breyer, the reasonableness standard 
announced in Booker demands that appellate courts review sentencing 
judges’ decisions more closely “when they rest upon [a] disagreement 
with Guidelines policy.”149 Conversely, appellate courts should review 
sentencing decisions with “greater deference” when they are based on 
case-specific factors.150 Thus, rather than grant sentencing judges the 
                                                                                                                      
144 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 448–49, 454–55. 
145 552 U.S. at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 Id.; see Cavera, 550 F.3d at 193 (noting that “varying from the Guidelines in a ‘mine-
run’ case may invite closer appellate review, especially when the Guidelines at issue are a 
product of traditional empirical and experiential study”); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 62, 68 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that sentencing judges may not simply give the “Guidelines a 
polite nod [and] then proceed essentially as if the [SRA] had never been enacted,” and 
concluding that “[a]ppellate review for abuse of discretion is not an empty formality”). 
Additionally, the Court in Kimbrough noted that the Commission itself disagreed with the 
differential treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenders. 552 U.S. at 109–10 (declin-
ing to apply the sliding scale framework for policy disagreements to the Guidelines’ treat-
ment of cocaine offenders, which the Court suggested was neither the product of empiri-
cal analysis nor supported by the Commission). In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit held that the Antitrust Guideline is not the product of empirical study. 
United States v. VandeBrake (VandeBrake II ), 679 F.3d 1030, 1037–40 (8th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-488). Rather, the Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the Commission’s policy choices echoed Congress’s antitrust policies. Id. at 
1038. Accordingly, the sentencing judge’s policy variance from the Antitrust Guideline did 
not implicate Kimbrough’s “closer review” standard. Id. 1038–39. 
147 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
148 See 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
149 Id. at 1255; see Gall, 552 U.S. at 61 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that sentencing 
judges “must give the policy decisions that are embodied in the Sentencing Guidelines at 
least some significant weight in making a sentencing decision”). 
150 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1255 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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freedom to “disregard the Guidelines at will,” this approach permits a 
judge to vary when the facts of a case would make it “reasonable” to do 
so.151 
 Thus, according to Justice Breyer, this framework ensures that 
judges remain faithful to Congress’s primary objective in creating the 
Commission: promoting consistency and uniformity in sentencing.152 
In addition, it provides sentencing judges with sufficient flexibility to do 
justice in individual cases.153 The framework thereby accounts for the 
“discrete institutional strengths” of the Commission, appellate courts, 
and sentencing judges by preserving the Commission’s role in devising 
nationally uniform sentencing policies while recognizing that sentenc-
ing judges usually have a firmer grasp of particular cases.154 
 Furthermore, as Justice Breyer argues, Booker preserved the Guide-
lines in their advisory form to remain faithful to Congress’s basic intent 
to foster uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.155 Congress 
delegated to the Commission the authority to develop and refine sen-
tencing practices and policy over time.156 Accordingly, this framework 
ensures that the Commission is given the opportunity to collect sen-
tencing judges’ reasons for policy-based variances, to examine appellate 
court reactions, and to develop statistical and other empirical informa-
tion to aid in the “iterative, cooperative institutional effort to bring 
about a more uniform and a more equitable sentencing system.”157 
                                                                                                                      
 
151 Id. at 1252. The Solicitor General, however, has argued that imposing limits on sen-
tencing judges’ discretion to vary from the Guidelines for policy reasons could leave the 
Guidelines effectively mandatory in some cases. Brief for the United States at 9–11, 
Vazquez v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1135 (2010) (No. 09-5370), 2009 WL 5423020, at *9–
11. The Solicitor General reasoned that such a scheme is “fundamentally inconsistent” 
with the Court’s remedy in Booker. Id. Commentators have opined that this position invites 
guideline-by-guideline scrutiny by sentencing judges, and thus may ultimately prompt 
Congress to impose a new mandatory sentencing scheme. Hardiman & Heppner, supra 
note 32, at 34. 
152 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
153 See id. at 1253–54. 
154 See id. (noting that “trial court[s] typically better understand[] the individual circum-
stances of particular cases . . . while the Commission has comparatively greater ability to 
gather information [and] to consider a broader national picture”); see also Rita, 551 U.S. at 
348 (noting that the sentencing judge and the Commission each attempt to develop sen-
tences that reflect the goals of sentencing, albeit “one, at retail, the other at wholesale”). 
155 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–54 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
156 See id. at 1255. 
157 Id.; Rita, 551 U.S. at 350 (“The Commission’s work is ongoing. The statutes and the 
Guidelines themselves foresee continuous evolution helped by the sentencing courts and 
courts of appeals in that process.”); see U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Report on the Con-
tinuing Impact of United States v. Booker on Federal Sentencing pt. A, at 112–13 
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 The general unreviewability of sentencing decisions in the pre-
Guidelines era raised significant abuse of power concerns, thereby un-
dermining faith in the rule of law.158 Thus, as one commentator has 
noted, appellate authority to “reject some sentences as unreasonable 
correlations between facts and outcomes” is an essential element of the 
advisory Guidelines regime.159 Without such authority, courts could 
return to pre-Guidelines practices and issue sentences anywhere within 
the broad statutory range for an offense.160 Therefore, meaningful ap-
pellate review for substantive reasonableness may help minimize dis-
ruption to the Commission’s sentencing policies while providing an 
avenue for the Guidelines’ gradual development.161 
C. The Antitrust Sentencing Guideline 
 Sentencing under the Antitrust Guideline is complex and has 
evolved over time in response to shifting social norms and congressional 
escalation of statutory penalties.162 The Antitrust Guideline tracks the 
structure of the other guidelines, providing a base offense level and ad-
justments based on specific offense conduct.163 
 Base offense levels “measure[] society’s initial disapprobation for 
the type of activity in question.”164 The offense level then gradually in-
creases based on specific offense conduct, including the amount of 
harm caused by the defendant and other factors such as the defendant’s 
role in the offense.165 To measure specific offense conduct for both cor-
porate and individual defendants, the Antitrust Guideline uses a proxy 
for the economic harm inflicted by a cartel: the volume of commerce.166 
The volume of commerce measures the sales of a participant in a con-
                                                                                                                      
(2012) (recommending that Congress require heightened review of sentences based on 
policy disagreements with the Guidelines). 
158 Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 170–72. 
159 Bowman, supra note 30, at 440. 
160 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
161 Id. at 1255. 
162 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1 (2012); infra notes 
170–187 and accompanying text. 
163 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1. 
164 United States v. Napoli, 179 F.3d 1, 10 (2d Cir. 1999). 
165 See id.; see also Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 55, 68–70 (observing that the 
Guidelines “are structured to ensure that every unit of additional harm is met with an 
additional unit of punishment”). 
166 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background (explaining that the Antitrust Guideline re-
lies on a proxy for economic harm because of the administrative complexity of establishing 
antitrust damages); see also Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 263–65 (1946) 
(describing the counterfactual inquiry required to determine antitrust damages). 
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spiracy “or his principal in goods or services that were affected by the 
violation.”167 The procedure used to determine the final sanction in car-
tel cases, however, differs for individuals and corporations.168 
 This Section begins by describing the evolution of antitrust sen-
tencing policy and then summarizes the current sentencing procedure 
for corporations and individuals under the Antitrust Guideline.169 
1. The Evolution of Antitrust Sentencing Policy 
 In 1987, the initial Antitrust Guideline’s principal goal was to deter 
cartel activity.170 The Commission, however, concluded that past sen-
tencing practice—used to develop guidelines for most other offenses— 
was too lenient for white-collar crimes, including antitrust, fraud, and 
tax offenses.171 Accordingly, the Commission departed from its default 
empirical method for devising guidelines and mandated stiffer penal-
ties for white-collar criminals, including prison sentences.172 
 The DOJ, through its ex officio membership on the Commission, 
argued that sanctions imposed under the Antitrust Guideline should 
optimally deter cartel activity.173 Optimal penalties seek to reduce the 
sum of three costs: (1) the costs of the undesirable conduct; (2) the 
costs of enforcement, including detection; and (3) the costs of inflict-
ing punishment, including the economic inefficiencies caused by un-
derdeterrence or overdeterrence.174 Therefore, optimal penalties must 
ensure that businesses refrain from cartel behavior without imposing 
unnecessary costs.175 
                                                                                                                      
167 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(b). As the commentary to the Antitrust Guideline explains, “[t]ying 
the offense level to the scale or scope of the offense is important in order to ensure that the 
sanction is in fact punitive and that there is an incentive to desist from a violation once it has 
begun.” Id. § 2R1.1 cmt. background. 
168 See id. § 2R1.1 cmt. 2–3. 
169 See infra notes 170–213 and accompanying text. 
170 United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Deterrence is the 
goal most pertinent to the antitrust guideline.”). 
171 Breyer, supra note 14, at 20–21. 
172 See id. at 17–18, 20–21. These policy-based departures, however, were not devoid of 
empirical or experiential support. See infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text. 
173 Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 342–43. 
174 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust’s Protected Classes, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (1989). 
175 Landes, supra note 16, at 656 (concluding that an optimal fine “should equal the 
net harm to persons other than the offender”); Werden, supra note 5, at 28–29 (arguing 
that cartel sanctions “must produce sufficient disutility to outweigh what the participants 
expect to gain from the cartel activity”). 
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 The optimal penalty for cartel activity equals the social cost of the 
activity divided by the probability of detection.176 Based on its analysis 
of prior cases, the DOJ concluded that the average overcharge imposed 
by a price-fixing conspiracy is ten percent.177 It also found that the 
probability of detection is only one in ten.178 The DOJ recommended 
these figures to the Commission, which adopted them as core assump-
tions underlying the Antitrust Guideline.179 And, although these esti-
mates have received hearty academic criticism,180 the Commission has 
not revisited this issue since 1987.181 
                                                                                                                     
 The Commission, however, periodically amended the Antitrust 
Guideline to reflect the gradual escalation of statutory penalties for 
Sherman Act offenses.182 For example, in 2004, Congress substantially 
increased penalties under the Act to signal dissatisfaction with the leni-
ent treatment of antitrust crime relative to other sophisticated frauds.183 
Shortly thereafter, the Commission eliminated language in the Antitrust 
Guideline commentary184 that stated that general deterrence was its 
controlling consideration.185 Thus, as penalties for Sherman Act viola-
tions grew more punitive, the Commission opened the door to consid-
 
176 Landes, supra note 16, at 657; accord Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 342 (cit-
ing Statement of Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 8–9 
( July 15, 1986)). Therefore, if the total harm inflicted by a cartel is 100 and the probability 
of detection and successful prosecution is 0.10, then the optimal penalty for the offense is 
1000 (100/0.10). See Landes, supra note 16, at 657. 
177 Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 342–43. 
178 Id. at 347–49. 
179 See Connor & Lande, supra note 15, at 524–26. 
180 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 68, at 304; Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 343–
49 (questioning the assumptions underlying the Antitrust Guideline); Connor & Lande, 
supra note 15, at 523–32 (arguing that the average cartel overcharge exceeds ten percent). 
181 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1 cmt. 3 (2012) (stating 
that the average cartel overcharge is ten percent). 
182 See supra notes 80–94 and accompanying text. 
183 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines 7 (Apr. 29, 
2005), http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Amendments/Official_Text/20050429_Amendments.pdf 
(“Th[is] amendment responds to congressional concern about the seriousness of antitrust 
offenses and provides for antitrust penalties that are more proportionate to those for sophis-
ticated frauds . . . .”); see supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. 
184 The Guidelines state that the official commentary “is to be treated as the legal 
equivalent of a policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7. The commentary “may provide back-
ground information, including factors considered in promulgating the guideline or rea-
sons underlying promulgation of the guideline,” and therefore, may guide reasonableness 
review. See id. 
185 Compare U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background (2004) (“The controlling consideration 
underlying this guideline is general deterrence.”), with U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background 
(2005) (omitting language concerning general deterrence). 
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eration of other penological goals, including just deserts.186 Moreover, 
to the extent the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, which rendered 
the Guidelines advisory, expands a sentencing judge’s discretion, sen-





lates the base fine (twenty percent), she refers to the Organizational 
                                                                                                                     
2. reatment of Organizations 
 The Antitrust Guideline was the first guideline to contain provi-
sions related to sentencing corporate defendants.188 In its current itera-
tion, the Antitrust Guideline advises a sentencing judge to use twenty 
percent of the volume of commerce affected by an antitrust violation as 
the base corporate fine.189 Once a sentencing judge determines the vol-
ume of commerce,190 she is directed to the Organizational Guideli
w h provides detailed instructions for sentencing organizations.191 
 The Antitrust Guideline works in tandem with the Organizational 
Guideline to vary the fine imposed according to the firm’s culpabil-
ity.192 Once the judge determines the volume of commerce and calcu-
 
186 See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text; cf. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren 
Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65 Stan. L. Rev. 77, 79 (2013) (proposing 
that “while liability rules should still depend primarily on desert, punishment rules that 
focus on the utilitarian goals of specific deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation . . . 
are not only superior at accomplishing crime prevention but can also usually assuage soci-
ety’s urge for retribution”). 
187 See 543 U.S. at 304–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part) (noting that the judge’s consid-
eration of the statutory goals of sentencing requires that the judge make a choice between 
the “fundamental criteria governing penology,” thereby “authoriz[ing] the judge to apply his 
own perceptions of just punishment”); United States v. VandeBrake (VandeBrake I ), 771 F. 
Supp. 2d 961, 999–1011 (N.D. Iowa 2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012) (VandeBrake II ), 
cert. denied, 81 U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-488); infra notes 221–244 and ac-
companying text. 
188 Diana E. Murphy, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations: A Decade of Pro-
moting Compliance and Ethics, 87 Iowa L. Rev. 697, 699 & n.6 (2002). 
189 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(d)(1). 
190 Id. Although the volume of commerce proxy was intended to simplify the harm cal-
culation in antitrust sentencing, the courts of appeals are divided on the interpretation of 
the Antitrust Guideline’s “affected by” language. See Julia Schiller et al., Towards Conver-
gence: The Volume of “Affected” Commerce Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and “Impact” Anal-
ysis Under the Clayton Act, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 987, 991–94 (2011). 
191 See U.S.S.G. ch. 8, introductory cmt. (noting that the assessment of an organization’s 
culpability is based on such factors as the prior history of the organization and the existence 
of a corporate compliance program). See generally U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Chapter Eight Fine 
Primer: Determining the Appropriate Fine Under the Organizational Guidelines (Apr. 2011) [herein-
after Organizational Fine Primer], http://www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/Primer_Organization- 
al_Fines.pdf (describing the process for determining corporate fines). 
192 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(d) cmt. 3. 
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Guideline to determine a firm’s final offense level.193 First, the judge 
calculates a culpability score based on aggravating and mitigating fac-
tors.194 This score, in turn, corresponds to a pair of minimum and 
maximum “culpability multipliers.”195 The judge then multiplies the 
base fine amount by the minimum and maximum culpability multipli-
ers to arrive at the fine range.196 At this point, the judge is directed to 
impose a fine within the fine range after considering various sentenc-
ing factors, including those provided by statute.197 For antitrust of-
fenses, however, the multipliers may only vary between .75 and 4, 
thereby producing a total fine between fifteen and eighty percent of 
the volume of commerce.198 
 As the Commission’s commentary explains, the Antitrust Guide-
line considers both the gains to the cartel and the losses suffered by its 
victims.199 Thus, once the Commission adopted the DOJ’s estimate that 
the average cartel overcharge (i.e., the gain for the cartel) was ten per-
cent,200 it doubled the figure to account for losses.201 Such losses in-
clude economic inefficiencies and injury to consumers who are priced 
out of the market.202 In cases where the actual overcharge appears to 
vary significantly from this estimate, the Commission recommends that 
“this factor should be considered in setting the fine within the guideline 
fine range.”203 Accordingly, the base fine of twenty percent of the vol-
ume of commerce is intended to provide adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct, even though the actual overcharge may differ from 
case to case.204 
                                                                                                                      
193 See id. 
194 See id. § 8C2.5; Organizational Fine Primer, supra note 191, at 3–5. 
195 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6; Organizational Fine Primer, supra note 191, at 5. 
196 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.7; Organizational Fine Primer, supra note 191, at 5. 
197 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.8; Organizational Fine Primer, supra note 191, at 5 (describing the 
court’s consideration of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) and 3572(a) 
(2006)). 
198 See U.S.S.G. §§ 2R1.1(d)(2), 8C2.6 cmt. 1. 
199 Id. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3. 
200 See supra notes 176–181 and accompanying text. 
201 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3. 
202 See id. (“The loss from price-fixing exceeds the gain because, among other things, in-
jury is inflicted upon consumers who are unable or for other reasons do not buy the product 
at the higher prices.”); see also Connor & Lande, supra note 15, at 523 (“[T]he Guidelines’ 
commentary implies that the doubling could be due to such factors as the allocative ineffi-
ciency harms of market power, the disruptive effects on victims, the lack of prejudgment 
interest . . . and/or the umbrella effects of market power.” (footnote omitted)). 
203 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
204 See supra notes 170–181 and accompanying text. 
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3. Treatment of Individuals 
 For individuals, the Antitrust Guideline applies a base offense level 
of twelve,205 and provides for adjustments based on the quantity of 
harm.206 Again, harm is primarily measured by the volume of com-
merce.207 As with corporate defendants, however, the sentencing judge 
is also instructed to consider other factors, including the defendant’s 
role in the offense, cooperation with enforcers, and acceptance of re-
sponsibility.208 
 The most significant feature of the Antitrust Guideline’s individual 
sentencing framework is prison sentences.209 As the commentary ex-
plains, the Commission believes that prison sentences, which were ei-
ther extremely short or simply not used in pre-Guidelines practice, are 
necessary to deter antitrust crime.210 Moreover, the Commission con-
tinues to recommend that alternatives to imprisonment—so-called pub-
lic service sentences—not be used.211 
 In addition to imprisonment, the Antitrust Guideline recommends 
fines for individual offenders of between one and five percent of the 
volume of commerce.212 These stiff sanctions represented a dramatic 
departure from pre-Guidelines practice, and thus were intended to un-
derscore the seriousness of cartel conduct.213 
                                                                                                                      
205 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1. For a first-time offender, an offense level of twelve corresponds to 
a prison term of between ten and sixteen months. Id. ch. 5, pt. A. 
206 See id. § 2R1.1. 
207 See id. § 2R1.1 cmt. background; supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text. 
208 See id. § 2R1.1 cmt. 1–2. 
209 See Belinda A. Barnett, Senior Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminalization of Cartel 
Conduct: The Changing Landscape 1 (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/ 
speeches/247824.pdf (observing that prison sentences are necessary to deter hard-core car-
tel conduct because “[c]ompanies only commit cartel offenses through individual employ-
ees”). But see Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 342–43, 352–54 (arguing that jail time is 
not appropriate for economic crimes and that the Antitrust Guideline’s requirement of jail 
time may chill efficient business conduct). 
210 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. background (“Under the guidelines, prison terms for the-
se offenders should be much more common, and usually somewhat longer, than typical 
under pre-guidelines practice.”). See generally Gregory J. Werden & Marilyn J. Simon, Why 
Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, 32 Antitrust Bull. 917 (1987) (arguing that prison sen-
tences for hard-core cartel conduct are necessary to achieve general deterrence and do 
not risk chilling potentially procompetitive conduct). 
211 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 5. 
212 Id. § 2R1.1(c)(1). If the court finds that a defendant is unable to pay a fine, restitu-
tion is recommended. Id. § 2R1.1 cmt. 2. 
213 See id. § 2R1.1 cmt. background; supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
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III. Judicial Policy Disagreements with the Antitrust 
Sentencing Guideline 
 The framework for appellate review of judicial policy disagree-
ments with the Guidelines discussed in Part II promotes the gradual 
development of sentencing policy while preserving a role for sentenc-
ing judges to dispense moral judgment.214 Section A of this Part exam-
ines how judicial discretion to vary from the Antitrust Guideline, sub-
ject to appellate review for reasonableness, may further the goals of 
antitrust sentencing.215 Section B evaluates the potential for policy dis-
agreement with the Antitrust Guideline’s volume of commerce proxy, 
and then applies Justice Stephen Breyer’s proposed sliding scale defer-
ence framework to illustrate when such disagreements may properly 
survive reasonableness review.216 
A. The Complementary Roles of Judicial Discretion and Appellate Review in 
Advancing the Goals of Antitrust Sentencing 
 Effective deterrence depends, in part, on the uniformity and pre-
dictability of serious and swift punishment.217 Yet basic notions of just 
punishment demand that criminal sanctions are reasonably related to 
culpability.218 Judicial policy disagreements with the Guidelines, includ-
ing the Antitrust Guideline, are largely a byproduct of sentencing 
judges’ efforts to balance these competing values of criminal punish-
                                                                                                                      
214 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 147 (“[T]he most important capacity that 
judges bring to criminal sentencing is the ability to pronounce moral judgment that takes 
into account all aspects of the crime and the offender.”); Denny Chin, Sentencing: A Role for 
Empathy, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1561, 1581 (2012) (“We must call upon our life experiences 
and the wisdom and judgment that hopefully we have gained as we weigh competing con-
siderations to arrive at a just and fair sentence.”). But see Frankel, supra note 99, at 21 
(“[S]weeping penalty statutes allow sentences to be ‘individualized’ not so much in terms 
of defendants but mainly in terms of the wide spectrums of character, bias, neurosis, and 
daily vagary encountered among occupants of the trial bench.”). 
215 See infra notes 217–259 and accompanying text. 
216 See infra notes 260–346 and accompanying text. 
217 See Werden, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
218 Cf. Breyer, supra note 14, at 13 (describing the Commission’s struggle to balance 
the goals of uniformity and proportionality). 
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ment.219 Reasonableness review under the advisory Guidelines regime is 
still developing, but may help harmonize these sentencing objectives.220 
1. Individualized Assessments in Antitrust Sentencing 
 The concealed antitrust conspiracies typically targeted for criminal 
prosecution disrupt competitive markets and harm consumers.221 Al-
though the Antitrust Guideline initially sought to promote general de-
terrence, the stiff sanctions currently recommended by the Commission 
also place an emphasis on the moral wrongfulness of cartel conduct.222 
This evolution of antitrust sentencing policy was prompted by both con-
gressional escalation of Sherman Act penalties and shifting social 
norms.223 
 Additionally, under the advisory Guidelines regime, judges may 
weigh the goals of sentencing and impose sentences based on the facts 
of particular cases.224 Consequently, enhanced judicial discretion may 
destabilize the uniform antitrust sentencing policies promulgated by 
the Commission in the Antitrust Guideline.225 For instance, sentencing 
judges may vary from the Antitrust Guideline to better calibrate fines 
and prison terms based on a particular offender’s culpability.226 As a 
general matter, however, sentencing judges must first calculate and 
consider the recommended Guidelines sentence and provide reasons 
for any variance.227 Judges who decide to vary from the Antitrust 
                                                                                                                      
219 See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 22 (noting that “even if deterrence of 
crime is the general aim of a system of criminal prohibitions, ‘just desert’ (or retribution) 
should be a limit on the distribution of punishment”). 
220 See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1253–55 (2011) (Breyer, J. concurring); 
cf. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 170 (arguing that appellate review of sentencing 
decisions will create a “federal common law of sentencing”). 
221 See Werden, supra note 5, at 25–26; supra notes 46–79 and accompanying text. 
222 See Caron Beaton-Wells, Capturing the Criminality of Hard Core Cartels: The Australian 
Proposal, 31 Melb. U. L. Rev. 675, 677–78 (2007); supra notes 182–187 and accompanying 
text. 
223 See supra notes 182–187 and accompanying text; cf. Stucke, supra note 74, and 487–
88 (urging courts and enforcers to rely on society’s “moral intuition” when condemning 
cartel conduct). 
224 See supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
225 See Priester, supra note 32, at 55–63; cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 263–
65 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion in part) (holding that an advisory Guidelines 
regime, subject to appellate review for reasonableness, will continue to fulfill Congress’s 
goals of advancing uniformity, proportionality, and honesty in sentencing). 
226 See United States v. VandeBrake (VandeBrake I ), 771 F. Supp. 2d 961, 999–1011 
(N.D. Iowa 2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2012) (VandeBrake II ), cert. denied, 81 
U.S.L.W. 3470 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2013) (No. 12-488). 
227 See supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
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Guideline ought to consider the seriousness of hard-core cartel con-
duct, the gradual escalation of Sherman Act penalties, and the deter-
rence goals of the Commission.228 In most cases, these factors should 
weigh heavily against downward variances from the Antitrust Guideline, 
which seeks to deter conduct that inflicts serious economic harm.229 
                                                                                                                     
 Nevertheless, in a particular case, a judge may find that the Anti-
trust Guideline fails to produce a sentence that is “sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary” to deter and punish cartel activity.230 For in-
stance, the Antitrust Guideline’s simplifying assumptions may lead to 
anomalous results.231 In the context of corporate penalties, the volume 
of commerce proxy may dramatically understate or overstate the actual 
cartel overcharge.232 Similarly, when sentencing an individual to prison, 
the Antitrust Guideline’s offense level enhancement scheme, which is 
linked to the volume of commerce, may fail to account adequately for 
actual offense conduct.233 In such cases, the judge may impose a vari-
ance because the nature of the offense takes the case outside the 
“heartland” of cases to which the Antitrust Guideline was intended to 
apply.234 Thus, with sufficient flexibility, judges can better account for 
the actual harm inflicted by individual cartels, and thereby calibrate 
particular sentences to the offender’s culpability.235 
 Additionally, placing greater focus on the moral content of cartel 
offenses may promote honesty in sentencing by better reflecting the 
policy goals of courts, enforcers, and the Commission.236 For instance, 
 
228 See supra notes 63–67, 80–94, 170–187 and accompanying text. 
229 See Stucke, supra note 74, at 465–66 (noting that Congress has repeatedly disagreed 
with commentators who have concluded that Sherman Act penalties are excessive); Wer-
den, supra note 5, at 26 (arguing that cartel activity cannot be mistaken for procompetitive 
activity, and therefore that serious sanctions do not risk overdeterrence). 
230 See VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 999–1011. 
231 See id. at 1002–03. 
232 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, Report and Recommendations 301 (2007), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report. 
pdf; Schiller et al., supra note 190, at 994–1002 (reasoning that reliance on the volume of 
commerce proxy runs afoul of the Court’s command that judges make an individualized 
assessment of the sentencing factors in each case, and arguing that the twenty percent vol-
ume of commerce proxy is likely too harsh for the average antitrust case). 
233 See VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 1002–03 (finding that the defendant’s participa-
tion in three regional price-fixing conspiracies for ready-mix concrete resulted in a more 
harmful monopoly). 
234 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007); see VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d 
at 987–89 (discussing the applicability of the Supreme Court’s recent sentencing decisions to 
judicial policy disagreements with the Antitrust Guideline). 
235 VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 999–1011. 
236 See Stucke, supra note 74, at 487–88, 537. 
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sentencing discretion may permit judges to openly pursue other valid 
goals of white-collar sentencing, including moral condemnation.237 
Hard-core cartel conduct is subject to the per se rule and prosecuted 
criminally because all agree that such conduct causes significant disrup-
tion to free markets, and thereby harm to consumers.238 Indeed, cartel 
conduct not only harms economic efficiency, but also transfers wealth 
from consumers to price fixers.239 Thus, judges may punish cartel of-
fenses as violations of moral norms against cheating and stealing.240 
 Finally, although the Commission departed from its traditional 
empirical method of assessing past sentencing practice to develop the 
Antitrust Guideline, the Commission did not lack an empirical basis for 
its policy choices.241 Rather, it relied on a DOJ study of price-fixing 
cases that found an average cartel overcharge of ten percent.242 Based 
on this estimate, it developed the volume of commerce proxy for total 
economic harm used to calculate the base fine for corporate defen-
dants and to calibrate jail sentences for individuals.243 The Commis-
sion, however, should frequently reevaluate its reliance on these simpli-
fying assumptions to better insulate the Antitrust Guideline from 
judicial policy disagreements.244 
                                                                                                                     
2. Appellate Review Promotes Deterrence of Cartel Conduct by 
Policing the Outer Bounds of Sentencing Discretion 
 To deter cartel conduct, criminal penalties must be set such that 
aspiring cartelists can readily determine that the costs of conspiring to 
fix prices, rig bids, or allocate markets substantially outweigh the bene-
 
237 Id. at 488 (concluding that “courts . . . should not rely solely upon [optimal deter-
rence] theory in determining the optimal sanctions to deter antitrust violations, especially 
when morality, an older and more powerful sanction, is available to supplement the eco-
nomic penalty”). 
238 See supra notes 46–79 and accompanying text. 
239 See Lande, supra note 73, at 75–77, 93–96. 
240 See supra notes 73–76, 182–187 and accompanying text; cf. Stith & Cabranes, supra 
note 11, at 177 (“In a world in which discretion cannot be avoided—because justice must 
be administered by human beings—we must learn once again to trust the exercise of 
judgment in the courtroom . . . .”). 
241 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1 cmt. background 
(2012) (“The limited empirical data available as to pre-guidelines practice showed that 
fines increased with the volume of commerce and the term of imprisonment probably did 
as well.”). 
242 See supra notes 176–181 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra notes 176–181, 188–213 and accompanying text. 
244 See Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, supra note 232, at 300–02. 
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fits.245 Insofar as judicial discretion in sentencing undermines predict-
ability, the deterrent effect of the Antitrust Guideline may be compro-
mised.246 Thus, meaningful appellate review for reasonableness pre-
serves the Guidelines’ deterrent effect.247 
 The discretion returned to sentencing judges post-Booker is cab-
ined in several important ways.248 First, a sentencing judge is required 
to use the recommended Guideline sentencing range as an initial 
benchmark.249 This tends to have an anchoring effect.250 Indeed, the 
SRA itself requires judges to consider the recommended Guideline 
range and to determine whether a variance would cause unwarranted 
disparity among similarly situated defendants.251 Second, the judge 
must ground departures in an applicable Guideline provision.252 Third, 
the judge must explain why any variances (i.e., non-Guideline depar-
tures) are justified in light of the congressionally prescribed goals of 
sentencing.253 And fourth, appellate review for abuse of discretion en-
sures that sentencing outcomes reasonably correspond to the facts of 
particular cases.254 
 The Supreme Court has declined to articulate a clear standard for 
reasonableness review of judicial policy disagreements with the Guide-
lines.255 In 2007, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Court noted that dis-
agreements based solely on a judge’s view that a guideline fails to 
achieve the goals of sentencing in ordinary cases may attract greater 
scrutiny.256 The pro-discretion tilt of the Court’s most recent sentencing 
cases, however, casts doubt on whether appellate courts may, in fact, ap-
                                                                                                                      
245 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 
1193, 1206 (1985) (“Once the expected punishment cost for the crime has been set, it 
becomes necessary to choose a combination of probability and severity of punishment that 
will bring that cost home to the would-be offender.”). 
246 See Werden, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
247 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 62 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that 
“sentencing judges must still give the Guidelines’ policy decisions some significant weight 
and that the courts of appeals must still police compliance”). 
248 See supra notes 122–161 and accompanying text. 
249 Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50. 
250 Cf. Scott, supra note 25, at 45 (concluding that sentencing judges may “assign too 
much weight to the guideline range, just because it offers some initial numbers”). 
251 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), (6) (2006); supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
252 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 1B.1(b) (2012). 
253 See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49–50; supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
254 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 262–64 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion in part); Bowman, 
supra note 30, at 440. 
255 Bowman, supra note 30, at 554–55; see supra notes 139–157 and accompanying text. 
256 Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
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ply meaningful scrutiny to maintain a role for the Guidelines.257 The 
Commission’s efforts to deter cartel activity were mostly policy driven.258 
Therefore, meaningful appellate scrutiny of judicial policy disagree-
ments is necessary to ensure that sentencing judges give appropriate 
deference to the Commission’s policy choices and that Congress’s goals 
of uniformity and proportionality in sentencing are respected.259 
B. Testing the Sentencing Commission’s Antitrust Sentencing Policies 
 Pursuant to its statutory authority to depart from past sentencing 
practice,260 the Commission chose to prescribe substantial increases 
over average prior sentences for white-collar offenses.261 In doing so, 
the Commission sought to correct perceived inadequacies in white-
collar sentencing.262 The Commission, however, departed from its de-
fault empirical method for developing these guidelines, namely, analy-
sis of prior sentencing data.263 Instead, it developed guidelines for anti-
trust, fraud, and tax offenses that provided a stronger deterrent to 
criminal conduct.264 Thus, the Commission’s decisions in these areas 
were driven by policy considerations.265 
 In 2005, in United States v. Booker, the U.S. Supreme Court salvaged 
Congress’s structured sentencing regime by rendering the Guidelines 
advisory.266 Since Booker, however, the Court has stressed that sentenc-
ing judges should continue to use the Guidelines as an initial bench-
mark to promote respect for the Commission’s institutional exper-
tise.267 Moreover, the Court has observed that when Guidelines are 
based on the Commission’s experience with particular conduct and 
review of empirical data, they are likely to produce recommended sen-
tences that are sufficient, but not greater than necessary to achieve the 
                                                                                                                      
257 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 447–55; see also Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1257 (Alito, J., dis-
senting) (warning that the Booker line of cases will eventually be reexamined if it sanctions 
a return to the system that prevailed prior to the SRA’s enactment). 
258 See supra notes 170–187 and accompanying text. 
259 See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“We do not, 
however, take the Supreme Court’s comments concerning the scope and nature of ‘closer 
review’ to be the last word on these questions.”). 
260 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (2006). 
261 See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
262 See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text. 
264 See supra notes 170–187 and accompanying text. 
265 See Breyer, supra note 14, at 20–21. 
266 543 U.S. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion in part); see supra notes 99–121 
and accompanying text. 
267 See supra notes 126–127 and accompanying text. 
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goals of sentencing.268 Thus, if a court varies from a guideline in an or-
dinary case exclusively because it disagrees with the Commission’s pol-
icy choice, its decision should draw more exacting appellate scrutiny.269 
This result furthers Congress’s intent to insulate the Commission from 
outside influence.270 
1. The Efficacy of the Ten Percent Cartel Overcharge Assumption and 
the Twenty Percent Volume of Commerce Proxy 
 Unlike some other white-collar crimes, the Commission decided to 
streamline the economic harm inquiry in antitrust cases.271 It thereby 
avoided importing the complex disputes over damages common in civil 
antitrust litigation.272 The Commission established the twenty percent 
volume of commerce proxy in 1991, yet it has not reevaluated or ex-
plained its rationale in over twenty years.273 
 Commentators have noted that the Commission primarily relied 
on a relatively small—and now dated—DOJ study of price-fixing cases 
                                                                                                                      
268 See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
269 See supra notes 139–161 and accompanying text. 
270 See Amy Baron-Evans & Kate Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631, 1636–40 
(2012) (describing how the SRA insulated the Commission from the political branches). 
Indeed, despite its exceedingly broad rulemaking authority, the Commission is not subject to 
appellate review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See 28 U.S.C. § 994(x) 
(2006) (selectively applying the APA’s notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures); S. Rep. 
No. 98-225, at 181 (1984) (“There is ample provision for review of the guidelines by the Con-
gress and the public; no additional review of the guidelines as a whole is either necessary or 
desirable.”). Judicial nullification of Commission policy, however, may serve as the functional 
equivalent of such review. See Priester, supra note 32, at 56–63 (describing how judges may use 
their new-found discretion to challenge the policy choices of the Commission); infra notes 
340–346 and accompanying text. 
271 Compare U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1(d) (2012) (in-
structing the sentencing judge to apply the twenty percent volume of commerce proxy to 
determine a corporation’s fine in antitrust cases), with id. § 8C2.4(a)–(b) (instructing the 
sentencing judge to inquire into the pecuniary gain or loss from the offense caused by an 
organization in other white-collar cases, including tax and fraud offenses). 
272 See supra notes 164–168 and accompanying text. But see Antitrust Modernization 
Comm’n, supra note 232, at 301 (recommending that the Commission reevaluate the feasi-
bility of individually tailored harm calculations in light of the “current ability of lawyers 
and economists to estimate harm” in antitrust cases); Schiller et al., supra note 190, at 
1010–11 (arguing that criminal defendants should be permitted to dispute the volume of 
commerce proxy by relying on econometric techniques used to calculate damages in civil 
antitrust cases). 
273 Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 342; Connor & Lande, supra note 15, at 522–
23; see Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, supra note 232, at 300–01 (recommending 
that the Commission reassess the twenty percent proxy in light of new empirical data). 
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to support this “simplifying assumption.”274 Unlike the DOJ, these 
commentators have estimated that the average cartel overcharge is 
twenty-five percent, with higher overcharges possible.275 The DOJ’s re-
cent prosecutions of major cartels lend considerable anecdotal support 
to these findings.276 Accordingly, the Commission’s twenty percent vol-
ume of commerce proxy may substantially underdeter cartel activity.277 
 Alternatively, an older study estimated that the average overcharge 
in price-fixing cases is, in fact, far below ten percent.278 Moreover, its 
authors argued that the risk of erroneous prosecution chills legitimate 
business conduct.279 Yet, the reliability of the Commission’s ten percent 
overcharge assumption has not been subjected to vigorous judicial 
scrutiny.280 To compensate for possible variation among individual 
cases, the Antitrust Guideline instructs sentencing judges to consider 
evidence that the actual overcharge is substantially lower or higher than 
ten percent.281 Judges, however, are to consider this evidence only to 
set the fine within the narrow guideline range.282 Therefore, this in-
struction, taken alone, fails to provide judges with sufficient flexibility 
to punish cartel offenders in outlier cases.283 
                                                                                                                      
274 Connor & Lande, supra note 15, at 525–26 (noting that the “Commission’s simplifying 
assumption that cartels raise prices by 10%—is supported by a surprisingly small amount of 
evidence”). 
275 Id. at 540–41. Indeed, in 2000, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) settled 
charges against four pharmaceutical companies that had conspired to fix prices for ge-
neric anti-anxiety medications. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Reaches Record 
Financial Settlement to Settle Charges of Price Fixing in Generic Drug Market (Nov. 29, 
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/11/mylanfin.shtm. The FTC alleged that the defen-
dants had succeeded in raising prices by up to three thousand percent. Id. 
276 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Taiwan-Based AU Optronics Corporation 
Sentenced to Pay $500 Million Criminal Fine for Role in LCD Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Sept. 
20, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2012/287189.pdf (LCD price-
fixing cartel); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Samsung Agrees to Plead Guilty and to Pay 
$300 Million Criminal Fine for Role in Price-Fixing Conspiracy (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www. 
justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/212002.pdf (dynamic random access memory 
price-fixing cartel). 
277 See Connor & Lande, supra note 15, at 561–62. 
278 Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 343–45. 
279 Id. at 353–54. But see Werden, supra note 5, at 26 (stating that serious cartel sanc-
tions “do[] not chill any legitimate, procompetitive conduct that could be mistaken for 
cartel activity; there is no risk of over-deterrence”). 
280 See supra note 273 and accompanying text. 
281 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1 cmt. 3 (2012). 
282 See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006); U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3. 
283 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3; supra notes 221–235 and accompanying text. Of course, 
a sentencing judge is no longer strictly confined by this instruction. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 
244–46 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion in part). 
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 Furthermore, in 2007, the Antitrust Modernization Commission 
(“AMC”) recommended that the Sentencing Commission “reevaluate 
and explain its rationale” for the ten percent cartel overcharge assump-
tion, which underlies the twenty percent volume of commerce proxy.284 
The DOJ opposed this recommendation, reasoning that fines under 
the Antitrust Guideline are intended to promote general deterrence, 
not to calculate harm with the precision demanded in civil treble dam-
ages actions.285 To date, the Commission has not acted.286 
 Additionally, the AMC recommended that the Commission recon-
sider whether reliance on a proxy is consistent with the principle that 
punishment should be calculated based on actual harm (i.e., real of-
fense conduct) in individual cases.287 Although the AMC found that the 
Commission adopted the volume of commerce proxy to simplify the 
complex harm calculation process, it noted that advances in economic 
learning may negate the Commission’s administrability concerns.288 
The AMC further opined that use of a simplifying proxy was in tension 
with Booker’s constitutional holding that facts not proven to the jury or 
admitted by the defendant may not be used to increase a defendant’s 
sentence.289 Ultimately, the AMC proposed that the Commission con-
sider allowing defendants or the government to rebut the ten percent 
overcharge assumption underlying the volume of commerce proxy.290 
 The AMC’s concerns are now amply supported by the Supreme 
Court’s post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence.291 This Note now consid-
ers what level of deference a sentencing judge’s decision to vary from 
the volume of commerce proxy should receive when reviewed by appel-
late courts for substantive reasonableness.292 
                                                                                                                      
284 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, supra note 232, at 301 (“The Sentencing 
Commission should determine whether the existing proxy is empirically sound and accu-
rately reflects the best estimate of typical harm in antitrust cases.”). 
285 Scott D. Hammond, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement Be-
fore the Antitrust Modernization Commission 7 (Nov. 3, 2005), http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/testimony/247499.pdf (stating that “it is difficult and time consuming to estab-
lish gain or loss in antitrust cases and . . . general deterrence does not require an exact 
correlation between harm and punishment”). 
286 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(d)(1). 
287 Antitrust Modernization Comm’n, supra note 232, at 301. 
288 See id. 
289 See id. at 302. 
290 See id. 
291 See supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
292 See infra notes 293–346 and accompanying text. 
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2. Applying the Sliding Scale Deference Framework to Variances Based 
on Cartel Overcharge Anomalies 
 Suppose, for example, that Company A and Company B are lead-
ing pharmaceutical companies that produce two competing medica-
tions used to treat migraine headaches.293 Patients depend on the 
medications offered by A and B to treat their chronic and debilitating 
headaches, and thus demand is highly inelastic.294 A and B conspire to 
fix the price of their drugs to increase revenues, an agreement that lasts 
for two years before it is uncovered by a DOJ investigation.295 Prior to 
sentencing, an expert economic analysis reveals that the conspiracy im-
posed an overcharge of twenty-five percent.296 
 When the conspiracy is uncovered, A and B have each earned sales 
of $10 million.297 The Antitrust Guideline recommends base fines equal 
to twenty percent of the volume of commerce.298 Thus, A and B are 
each assessed base fines of $2 million.299 Further assume that the Organ-
izational Guideline prescribes the same culpability score for each firm, 
yielding identical minimum and maximum culpability multipliers.300 
The judge will then assess the various sentencing factors to set the fine 
within the applicable range.301 Depending on the assignment of a cul-
pability score and the judge’s assessment of the sentencing factors, the 
total fine for each firm could range between $1.5 million and $8 million 
(i.e., between fifteen and eighty percent of the volume of commerce).302 
 Further assume, however, that the sentencing judge determines by 
a preponderance of the evidence that, in fact, the firms imposed an 
                                                                                                                      
293 Cf. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 275 (announcing the settlement 
of the FTC’s investigation of price-fixing between generic drug makers). 
294 See Einer Elhauge, United States Antitrust Law and Economics 188 (2d ed. 
2011) (noting that demand is inelastic when buyers are less willing to switch to other prod-
ucts in response to an increase in price). 
295 Cf. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, supra note 275. 
296 See supra notes 287–290 and accompanying text (summarizing the AMC’s proposal 
that the Commission consider permitting individualized inquiry into the economic harm 
inflicted by cartels). The DOJ’s Antitrust Division employs a significant number of expert 
economists capable of analyzing the economic effects of individual cartels. Economic Analysis 
Group, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/eag.html (last visited Feb. 
23, 2013). 
297 See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2R1.1(d)(1) (2012). 
298 Id. 
299 See id. 
300 See id. § 2R1.1(d)(2); supra notes 192–198 and accompanying text. 
301 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3; supra notes 192–198 and accompanying text. 
302 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(d)(2) cmt. background; supra notes 192–198 and accompany-
ing text. 
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overcharge of twenty-five percent.303 The Antitrust Guideline instructs 
that where “the actual monopoly overcharge appears to be either sub-
stantially more or substantially less than 10 percent, this factor should 
be considered in setting the fine within the guideline fine range.”304 Yet, 
the sentencing judge finds that the facts of this case justify a variance 
from the Antitrust Guideline.305 Both firms knew that their customers 
depended on the drugs for the treatment of a chronic condition and 
that their customers could not switch to substitutes (i.e., that demand 
was highly inelastic).306 Thus, the judge considers the Antitrust Guide-
line’s twenty percent volume of commerce proxy as well as the over-
charge departure guidance, calculates the recommended fine, and de-
termines that an upward variance is required to ensure that the 
sentence is sufficient, but not greater than necessary to promote gen-
eral deterrence and punish the offenders.307 
 The judge imposes a base fine equal to fifty percent of the volume 
of commerce, doubling the actual cartel overcharge to account for the 
losses inflicted by the conspiracy.308 Thus, each firm is assessed a base 
fine of $5 million.309 The judge then calculates the fine range using the 
culpability multipliers.310 Accordingly, the total fine for each firm could 
range between $3.75 million and $20 million (i.e., between 37.5% and 
200% of the volume of commerce).311 
 The judge finds that the high overcharge in this case justified her 
disagreement with the Antitrust Guideline’s recommendation to re-
main within the fine range.312 Furthermore, she determines that a 
harsh punishment for the cartel participants is justified because their 
                                                                                                                      
303 Connor & Lande, supra note 15, at 540–41; see supra notes 274–277 and accompany-
ing text. 
304 U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3 (emphasis added). 
305 See supra notes 122–138 and accompanying text. 
306 See supra notes 293–296 and accompanying text. 
307 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 111 (holding that the sentencing judge “appropriately 
framed [his] final determination in line with § 3553(a)’s overarching instruction to ‘im-
pose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,’ to accomplish the sentencing 
goals advanced in § 3553(a)(2)”). 
308 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3 (reasoning that the estimated cartel overcharge, which 
measures the gain to the cartel, should be doubled to account for losses inflicted on vic-
tims and society). 
309 See id. § 2R1.1(d)(1). 
310 See id. § 2R1.1(d)(2); supra notes 192–198 and accompanying text. 
311 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1(d)(2) cmt. background; supra notes 192–198 and accompany-
ing text. 
312 See U.S.S.G. § 2R1.1 cmt. 3. 
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product was used to treat a serious medical condition.313 Finally, the 
judge concludes that this fine will send a clear message to other com-
panies that would consider fixing prices in settings where high over-
charges are possible, thus promoting general deterrence.314 Accord-
ingly, the judge concludes that this fine is sufficient, but not greater 
than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing.315 
 Under the framework for reviewing judicial policy disagreements 
described by the Supreme Court in Kimbrough, and elaborated by Jus-
tice Breyer in his concurrence in United States v. Pepper, the sentencing 
judge’s variance in the above example would likely survive reasonable-
ness review.316 An appellate court could conclude that case-specific fac-
tors, including strong evidence of the twenty-five percent overcharge 
and the price-fixing of a product necessary to treat a chronic medical 
condition, supported the sentencing judge’s variance in this case.317 
Moreover, the Commission could then consider the sentencing judge’s 
variance, along with variances made by other judges, to make gradual 
adjustments to the twenty percent volume of commerce proxy.318 
 Another example may help clarify the point.319 Assume a judge is 
assigned to a case involving three corporate defendants who plead 
guilty to fixing prices for a critical input used in the manufacture of 
ion-selective electrodes.320 Further assume that the judge simply con-
cludes that the Commission’s twenty percent volume of commerce 
proxy is wrong,321 and credits studies indicating that the average cartel 
overcharge is less than ten percent.322 Thus, the judge determines that 
a harm proxy of five percent is more appropriate.323 Despite the gov-
ernment’s objection that a downward variance from the twenty percent 
volume of commerce proxy may encourage other would-be price fixers, 
                                                                                                                      
313 Cf. VandeBrake I, 771 F. Supp. 2d at 999–1011 (imposing an upward variance on an 
individual antitrust defendant based, in part, on the factual circumstances of his case). 
314 See United States v. Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994). 
315 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
316 See supra notes 139–161 and accompanying text. 
317 See supra notes 139–161 and accompanying text. 
318 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1255 (Breyer, J., concurring); supra notes 144–157 and ac-
companying text. 
319 See infra notes 320–327 and accompanying text. 
320 Cf. Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1257 (Alito, J., dissenting) (warning of the horizontal ineq-
uities that result when the selection of a judge impacts sentencing outcomes). 
321 See United States v. Higdon, 531 F.3d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (observing that a sen-
tencing judge “should think long and hard before substituting his personal penal philoso-
phy for that of the Commission”). 
322 See Cohen & Scheffman, supra note 15, at 343–45. 
323 See id. 
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the judge doubles the overcharge, sets the base fine equal to ten per-
cent of the volume of commerce, and applies the Organization Guide-
line to calculate the final fine amount.324 
 The government appeals, arguing that the sentencing judge im-
properly relied on his own policy judgment regarding average cartel 
overcharges and failed adequately to justify the variance based on the 
facts of the case.325 The government notes that the judge’s categorical 
rejection of the volume of commerce proxy undermines the Commis-
sion’s role in setting nationally uniform antitrust sentencing policy.326 
Accordingly, the government asserts that the categorical rejection of 
the Commission’s proxy in this case is substantively unreasonable.327 
 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Spears v. United States 
presented an opportunity for the Court to consider facts somewhat 
similar to the above example—albeit in the context of cocaine sentenc-
ing.328 Unfortunately, the Court’s terse analysis did not fully resolve the 
dispute over the appropriate standard of review for judicial policy dis-
agreements.329 As Chief Justice John Roberts observed in his Spears dis-
sent, there is a legitimate dispute regarding whether individualized 
case-by-case assessments are necessary to determine whether a variance 
from a Guideline sentence is reasonable.330 Under Justice Breyer’s pro-
posed framework, “closer review” is required in this case because the 
judge has disregarded the Commission’s policy choice in an ordinary 
antitrust case without supporting the variance by case-specific analy-
sis.331 Accordingly, the appellate court could reject the judge’s sentence 
as substantively unreasonable because the judge has effectively usurped 
the role of the Commission and devised her own sentencing policy 
when the facts of the case do not support a variance.332 
                                                                                                                      
324 See supra notes 192–204 and accompanying text. 
325 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
326 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
327 See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109. 
328 555 U.S. 261, 267 (2009) (per curiam) (stating that Kimbrough held “that district 
courts are entitled to vary from the crack-cocaine guidelines in a mine-run case where 
there are no ‘particular circumstances’ that would otherwise justify a variance from the 
Guidelines’ sentencing range”). 
329 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
330 Spears, 555 U.S. at 269–70 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
331 Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra notes 139–161 and 
accompanying text. 
332 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Kimbrough, 552 U.S. 
at 116 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that although the Booker remedy does not permit ap-
pellate courts to treat the Commission’s policy choices as binding, sentencing judges must 
give those policy choices “significant weight”). 
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 The benefits of this approach to reviewing judicial policy dis-
agreements with the Antitrust Guideline are manifold.333 First, permit-
ting sentencing judges to vary the volume of commerce proxy when the 
facts of the case support a variance ensures that sanctions are propor-
tional to the actual harm inflicted.334 Second, requiring sentencing 
judges to ground policy-based variances in the facts of the case will fa-
cilitate informed appellate review.335 This ensures that the appeals 
process holds sentencing judges accountable, and thereby promotes 
respect for the rule of law.336 Third, allowing the Commission to collect 
and analyze sentencing judges’ reasons for variances from the volume 
of commerce proxy respects the institutional role and expertise of the 
Commission.337 It permits the Commission to consider whether, based 
on national experience, an adjustment to the volume of commerce 
proxy is needed, or indeed whether use of a proxy is appropriate.338 
Therefore, this framework for appellate review fulfills Congress’s objec-
tive of creating uniform and effective sentencing policies through the 
Commission.339 
 It is unclear what degree of deference an appellate court owes a 
sentencing judge who categorically rejects the Commission’s policy 
choice as not adequately supported by empirical evidence.340 This Sec-
tion merely applied one suggested framework whereby a sentencing 
judge’s decision to vary from a guideline based solely on policy grounds 
is subjected to greater scrutiny.341 This standard gives judges the flexi-
bility to do justice in particular cases while respecting the Commission’s 
central role in devising national sentencing policies.342 
 The Supreme Court’s decisions in Kimbrough and Spears do not 
necessarily command this limited result.343 Rather, these cases may sup-
                                                                                                                      
333 See infra notes 334–339 and accompanying text. 
334 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
335 See id.; see also Cavera, 550 F.3d at 191 (noting that the reasonableness standard “en-
sures that appellate review, while deferential, is still sufficient to identify those sentences 
that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions”). 
336 Cf. Stith & Cabranes, supra note 11, at 170 (arguing for reliance on appellate re-
view as the most appropriate mechanism to constrain judges’ discretion). 
337 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also supra notes 155–157 
and accompanying text (describing how appellate review of judicial policy disagreements 
will inform Commission policy making). 
338 See Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1253–55 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
339 See id. 
340 See supra notes 139–147 and accompanying text. 
341 See supra notes 293–339 and accompanying text. 
342 See supra notes 333–339 and accompanying text. 
343 See Bowman, supra note 30, at 454–55. 
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port the far broader proposition that a sentencing judge is permitted to 
subject the Commission’s policy choices to a more searching Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (“APA”) style “arbitrary and capricious” review.344 
This alternative interpretation would subject the Commission’s policy 
choices to the type of judicial scrutiny that Congress sought to avoid by 
exempting the Commission from judicial review under the APA.345 
Thus, it would significantly alter the distribution of power struck by 
Congress.346 
Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court’s remedy in United States v. Booker left many 
questions unanswered. Although the Court’s recent sentencing deci-
sions evince a clear trend toward enhanced judicial discretion in sen-
tencing, it remains unclear whether and to what extent a sentencing 
judge may vary from a particular guideline for policy reasons. This issue 
is of critical importance to the integrity of the Guidelines. As this Note 
explains, the integrity of the Antitrust Guideline depends on the pre-
dictability of stiff sanctions. The history of lax white-collar sentencing 
demonstrates that unchecked policy-based variances from the Guide-
lines could easily justify lenient sentences, thereby reducing the deter-
rent effect of the DOJ’s criminal antitrust enforcement program. 
 As with many other guidelines, the Commission chose to calibrate 
the punishment for antitrust offenses according to the quantum of 
harm inflicted by a conspiracy. Unfortunately, its reliance on a small 
DOJ study of cartel overcharges conducted in the early 1980s in devel-
oping the crucial volume of commerce proxy may render the Antitrust 
Guideline susceptible to policy-based variances. The role of reason-
ableness review, however, in ensuring a correlation between facts and 
outcomes may blunt the impact of judicial scrutiny of the Antitrust 
Guideline. Finally, judicial flexibility in antitrust sentencing may permit 
judges to express moral condemnation in appropriate cases. 
Frederick Thide 
 
344 Gertner, supra note 30, at 4. 
345 See supra note 270 and accompanying text (describing how Congress sought to insu-
late the Commission from political influence by selectively applying the APA’s provisions). 
346 See supra note 270 and accompanying text. 
